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Abstract: This article investigates the effects of China’s outward direct investment (ODI) on the
institutional quality of the Belt and Road (B&R) countries. Based on a panel data set of 63 B&R
countries during the period 2003 to 2016, we find that China’s ODI improves the institutional quality
of B&R countries not only in the short run but also in the long run. Further, although China’s ODI
exerts no differential impacts on host country institutional dimensions of “control of corruption,”
“government effectiveness,” and “political stability” in countries with different natural resource
endowments, it improves their institutional dimensions of “regulatory quality” and “rule of law,”
implying that China’s ODI may help the host B&R countries minimize the “resource curse”. As one
of the most important strategies for China’s opening-up development in the current era, the B&R
initiative serves as means to promote sustainable development of B&R countries. The article therefore
contributes to existing scholarship on the institutional effects of China’s ODI and sheds light on the
mechanisms that drive sustainable development.
Keywords: outward direct investment; institutional quality; belt and road countries; China
1. Introduction
Scholars have long recognized that better institutional quality of host countries encourages inflows
of foreign direct investment (FDI) [1–10]. However, research on the direct role of FDI in host country
institutional development or reform is limited [11]. The quality of a country’s institutions plays an
important role to realize the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations [12]. With the
accumulation of FDI and the increasing international expansion of multinational corporations (MNCs),
scholars suggest that the MNCs are not passive observers in host countries but are active players in
terms of political and economic issues.
Extant research suggests that FDI affects not only the economic development, but also government
policies and the institutional quality of host countries [13–19]. However, there is still no consensus,
both theoretically and empirically, that inward FDI improves the institutional quality of host countries.
Kwok and Tadesse [15] found that FDI flow reduced the host-country corruption levels. However,
Olney [20] found that competition for FDI from the US led to undercutting of regulatory labor markets
among the host countries. FDI inflows helped improve property rights protection, accountability, rule
of law, tax policies, and business regulations in host countries [21–23].
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Many recent studies have confirmed the positive effect of FDI, emanating mostly from developed
countries, on the institutional quality of host countries. Scholars have found that MNCs from developed
economies bring advanced management skills, sound business practices and industrial regulation
policies, which promote institutional reform within the host countries [15,16,22]. This stems from the
fact that the investing firm, originating from an advanced economy and investing in a developing
or emerging country, holds several firm specific advantages. However, another strand of the ODI
literature points to a less positive impact of direct investment in host countries that are developing
economies [13,18,24]. In particular, certain behaviors among MNCs from developed countries investing
in developing countries have raised concerns about the darker side of FDI. To some extent, the above
negative findings of FDI have increased the international community’s doubts about the rapid expansion
of MNCs in general. Investigations have found that these enterprises pay bribes and send informal gifts
to government officials to stimulate business growth in (for instance) China, India, and Pakistan [25].
The above findings are therefore mixed in terms of the effects of FDI from developed countries on
institutional quality of the host country. Also, given the recent increase in FDI from developing
countries, influence of FDI from developing countries on host country institutions is an area that
needs to be explored further. Particularly, FDI from Chinese firms has increased substantially in the
recent past [26]. Chinese MNCs, because of their strong demand for natural resources, are often eager
to invest in countries with relatively abundant natural resources [27–33]. Is it possible that those
countries would blindly rely on China’s natural resources demand, ignore the need for institutional
development, and ultimately fall under the “resource curse” syndrome? These topics are hotly debated
in existing literature, but such debates are mainly qualitative judgments or analyses of a few cases,
and lack rigorous empirical evidence. In our study we attempt to address the above gaps in the context
of China’s increasing ODI into the Belt and Road (B&R) countries.
B&R countries, which account for about 43 per cent of the world’s population (please see Figure 1),
is a key destination for China’s ODI [34]. The level of economic development in B&R countries is lower
than the world average. World Development Indicators (WDI) reveal that in 2016, the average GDP per
capita of this region was about $3815, accounting for only 37.4 per cent of the world average. The same
year also witnessed uneven economic development among B&R countries. In 2016, Qatar, Singapore,
and the United Arab Emirates ranked as the top three in GDP per capita terms, achieving 59.3, 53.0,
and 37.6 thousand USD, respectively. In contrast, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Tajikistan ranked as the
bottom three, with GDP per capita of $562, $729, and $796, respectively. Nevertheless, it must be noted
that, during the 2000s, B&R countries have made great progress in terms of economic development
and economic size. The gap between the region’s GDP per capita and the world average narrowed
generally from 2003 to 2016. The total GDP of this region as a percentage of the world total also
increased from 10.7 to 16.3 per cent during the same period (please see Figure 2). Meanwhile, China’s
ODI into B&R countries has increased significantly. During the period between 2003 and 2016, China’s
ODI flow as a percentage of the total FDI inflows to this region increased from 0.22 to 5.32 per cent,
while China’s ODI stock ratio increased from 0.15 to 2.78 per cent (please see Figure 2). Hence, China
has gradually become one of the B&R region’s most important FDI sources.
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Figure 2. China’s outward direct investment (ODI) flow and stock in B&R countries. Source: Authors’
calculations based on data from SBCOFDI for various years.
The B&R initiative, proposed by President Xi JinPing during his visits to Central and Southeast
Asian countries in September and October 2013, has received great attention from the international
community and further promote China’s ODI into this region. While the B&R initiative encompasses
many areas of economic integration and global governance [35], it is specifically an infrastructure-led
economic integration plan for integrating China’s trading partners by developing their infrastructure
(i.e., ports, roads, airports, railways, etc.,).The initiative manifests a Chinese commitment to investing
in a variety of infrastructure projects in order to strengthen the economic capacity and connectivity
among the B&R countries [36]. In the recent past scholars have paid considerable attention to this
initiative which has specifically aimed to invest in better connecting Europe, Middle East, Central
Asia, South-East Asia, and China [37–40]. Along with economic integration the B&R initiative
is also considered as a vehicle toward sustainable development [41–43]. This initiative, which is
an initiative for regional cooperation is suggested to have a positive impact on the sustainable
development of all the countries involved [44]. Through the various regional cooperation measures
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of this initiative it is expected to encourage regional economic advancement and social development
that drive sustainable development [45]. Scholars specifically suggest that the B&R initiative’s
objectives to provide increased accessibility to public goods to the global community through effective
communication, better connectivity, increased trade flows, and improved financing leads to prosperity
that ultimately promotes sustainable development [44]. Preliminary research has also examined the
initiatives’ association with the ecological footprint through positive environmental spillovers in the
countries involved [45]. Further, consistent with institutional theory it has been suggested by extant
research that the quality of a country’s institutions plays an important role to realize the Sustainable
Development Goals of the United Nations [12]. It is in the above context that we examine the role of
FDI from China in the institutional development of the B&R countries.
Scholars have used Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) to develop an understanding of the
institutional quality. During the period 2003 to 2016, indicators of government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, and rule of law were rising continuously in the B&R countries. The corruption control indicator
started to rise in 2011, whereas political stability and voice and accountability stayed roughly stable
during this period (please see Figure 3). Because institutional quality, as mentioned earlier, is critical
to a country’s productivity enhancement, long-term economic growth, and consequently sustainable
development [46,47], the specific question that is addressed in this study is whether China’s ODI
improves the institutional quality of B&R countries. This research question is all the more topical,
pertinent, and challenging in that an answer to this question will enrich the current body of research on
the institutional effects of direct investment particularly in the case of China (a developing economy)
as an investor, which is very much an unexplored issue. As a consequence, it will shed light on the
sustainable development prospects of the B&R initiative.
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The current study, therefore, operates at the interface of the literature on the impact of FDI on host
countries and the literature on the determinants of institutional quality and contributes to the broader
scholarship on economic integration and sustainable development. Our research specifically makes the
following contributions to the above literature. First, it is the first attempt to test the institutional effects
of China’s ODI on the B&R countries, which enriches the current body of research on the institutional
effects of FDI from developing countries. Second, it tries to distinguish the institutional effects
among countries with different natural resource endowments. Third, from an empirical perspective,
compared with the existing literature that focuses either on one aspect of institutional quality, such as
corruption [15,18,19], or on some aggregated index of institutional quality [13,22], this study tests the
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effects on all the six identified WGI indicators of institutional quality separately. We therefore use a
fine-grained approach for measuring institutional quality.
Using a panel data set of 63 B&R countries during the period 2003 to 2016, we apply a fixed
effects model to mitigate the countries’ culture and geographical heterogeneity in examining the
effects on institutional quality. We also extend the benchmark model to a dynamic setting that allows
us to measure the institutional persistence over time and employ the difference GMM (generalized
method of moments) estimator (i.e., Arellano-Bond estimator) to test the effects of China’s ODI on the
institutional quality of host countries both in the long term and in the short term.
The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section we review the theory on the effects
of FDI on institutional quality and derive testable hypotheses. Thereafter, we introduce the methods
section wherein we discuss the data, the variables used, estimation methods, and present our results.
Finally, we discuss our findings and conclude.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1. Theories of Institutional Effect of FDI
Extant literature has examined the effect of FDI on host countries through various perspectives.
Some scholars have examined the impact of FDI on host countries’ productivity [48,49],
de-industrialization [50,51], and economic growth [38], while others have investigated the influence of
FDI on the institutional quality of host countries and tried to disentangle the mechanisms behind it [3].
In less developed countries (which usually have a lower institutional quality), MNCs are likely to
be more productive than their local counterparts are. Thus, the entry of MNCs would crowd out, or
even replace, local firms and weaken market competition, resulting in higher economic rents and bribes
to government officials and investors respectively [18,19,24]. Demir [13], for example, is concerned
that the fierce competition between investors may encourage the foreign investors to bypass laws and
regulations in host countries through corrupt practices to maintain their market shares. Pinto and
Zhu [18] show that FDI is positively associated with levels of corruption in less-developed countries,
but not in developed countries. Zhu [19] applies this theory to the context of China and verifies that
provinces with more MNC activities tend to have a higher level of corruption. This “crowding out
effect” implies that FDI may ultimately deteriorate the institutional quality of host countries.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the “demonstration effect” of MNCs. MNCs generally
bring advanced information regarding management skills, business practices, and industry regulation
into host countries, which may assure the local governments of the importance of a sound institutional
environment in attracting more FDI and enhancing their countries’ international reputation [15].
Based on this argument, Kwok and Tadesse [15] found that FDI generates a positive spillover effect
on the institutional environment of host countries; in particular, it reduces their degree of corruption.
Zeng and Eastin [52] show that in order to establish a good reputation, the MNCs from less developed
countries also have the incentive to adopt a sound environmental practice in host countries, rather
than transfer the home countries’ poor practices across borders, which exerts a positive spillover effect
on environmental practices of host-country firms.
MNCs can also affect the host-country institutional quality through lobbying and exerting pressure
on local governments. It is widely accepted that MNCs have long-term interests in host countries
and are deeply embedded in local markets, and hence that they tend to engage in a governance
process and alter the host institutional environment for their own benefit by entering the domestic
political process [53–55]. By examining 27 transition economies, Malesky [16] notes that MNCs have
the incentive to lobby the local government and to raise the probability of economic reforms carried
out by the host-government. Ali, Fiess, and Macdonald [21] argue that foreign investors have an
incentive to lobby for institutional change when faced with an inefficient business climate, and they
find a positive effect of FDI inflows on property rights protection of host countries. In the case of
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Vietnam and China, Dang [22] and Long et al. [23] found a positive institutional effect of FDI inflows,
which also lends support to the “lobbying effect”.
Some scholars go a step further and argue that the direction of FDI’s institutional effect partly
depends on the institutional environment of the home country [15,56]. The behavior of MNCs may be
strongly constrained by the home country government. For example, the United States enacted the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, prohibiting American businesses from offering bribes to foreign
governments. The United Kingdom also introduced the Bribery Act in 2011 to combat bribery practices
among British companies, both at home and abroad. This regulatory pressure from the home country
raises opportunity costs for the MNCs engaging in corrupt behavior in order to secure business [15].
Prakash and Potoski [56] demonstrate that the institutional effects of FDI are not associated with how
much FDI host countries receive, but rather, where they receive it. They found that FDI improves the
ISO 14001 adoption rate (an environmental management standard) of host countries only when the FDI
comes from home countries with high levels of this environmental management standard. Demir [13]
argues that when investing in developing countries, developed countries push forward conditionality
requirements in order to put pressure on the host government to improve its institutional environment.
To a certain degree, this “regulation pressure effect” from the home country confines MNCs’ behavior
to a legitimate framework, which lays the foundation for positive institutional effects induced by FDI.
It is also worth noticing that the causal relationship between FDI and institution operates both
ways. A large body of the literature holds that sound institutional quality of host countries encourages
FDI inflows [1–4,10]. This fact increases the difficulty in explaining the causality between China’s
ODI and institutional quality of B&R countries, which is the focus in our current study. We, therefore,
employ the difference GMM method (i.e., Arellano-Bond estimator) into a panel data model to address
the above issue.
Based on the above literature review, we can infer that the institutional effect of FDI depends on
several factors, including the competitiveness of MNCs relative to the local firms, the market structure
in host countries, and the regulatory pressure from home countries. In contrast to the existing studies
on this topic, the present study analyses the effects of China’s ODI on the institutional quality of B&R
countries, which are mainly comprised of developing countries in Asia, Central and East Europe,
and North Africa.
2.2. Chinese ODI and Institutional Quality of B&R Host Countries
First, to the extent that economic development serves as a proxy for the competitiveness and
productivity of firms [18], we observe that China’s MNCs may have an advantage over the firms in
B&R countries on average. The reason is that China’s GDP per capita (a typical indicator of economic
development) is more than twice that of B&R countries (according to the WDI database, China’s GDP
per capita reached $8123 (current price) in 2016, and the GDP per capita of B&R region reached $3750
(current price, calculated as the total GDP over total population of B&R countries). This lays the
foundation for the demonstration effect. Second, China’s ODI into B&R countries accounts only for a
small share of total FDI absorbed by this region, which is increasing over time, but which has never
exceeded 7% historically (please see Figure 1). Hence, it is unlikely that Chinese MNCs will alter the
local market structure and gain a monopolistic status completely. Third, the Chinese government
implemented a series of laws and regulations in order to monitor the operation and investment
behaviors of Chinese MNCs, which include the measures on overseas investment administration
issued by the Ministry of Commerce in 2009, the Measures on Overseas Investment Authorization
and Registration issued by the National Development and Reform Commission in 2014, to name a
few. All of these exert regulatory pressure on Chinese MNCs operating abroad. In summary Chinese
ODI, we argue, is driven by “demonstration” and “regulatory” effects to facilitate improvement in the
institutional quality of the host countries. Hence, our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). China’s ODI improves the institutional quality of B&R countries.
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Another important motivation, as pointed out by extant research for China’s ODI is the country’s
abundant need for natural resources. The role of multinational firms in resource rich countries and
their interaction with the institutions of such countries is not well understood [57]. Countries rich in
natural resources suffer from the “resource curse” where increased resources lead to reduced growth
and development [57,58]. Institutional development of such countries is important to get over the
“resource curse”. Recent studies have shown that countries with strong institutions of democratic
accountability and rule of law tend to escape the resource curse, whereas those with weak institutions
do not [59,60]. The negative effects of natural resource dependence on institutional development have
been discussed extensively in literature [61]. The easy flow of revenues from natural resource exports
may facilitate the formation of a rentier state, leaving little incentive for the government to improve its
institutional quality [13].
China’s dependence on natural resources has been changing. Some empirical studies suggest
that oil and metals are two determinants of China’s ODI location during 2003–2009 [43]. However,
we cannot ignore the fact that the proportion of China’s ODI in the mining industry is declining over
the time. After it reached 48 per cent of total Chinese realized ODI in 2003, this proportion decreased
ever since. It has declined to 7.7 per cent and 1.0 per cent in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Meanwhile,
the proportion of ODI in manufacturing, financial services, leasing, and business services have been
increasing over time [62]. It is reported that high technology, real estate, finance, agribusiness, health
care sectors, etc., have become the more favorable target sectors of investment [63]. That is to say that
natural resources are losing their significance in China’s ODI. Hence, our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). China’s ODI exerts no systematically different impacts on the institutional quality of
countries with different natural resource endowments.
3. Data and Method
According to the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment [62], there are
64 B&R countries (please see Table 1), which are located in Asia, Central and East Europe and North
Africa. Considering the extraordinarily high institutional quality of Singapore, we exclude the data of
Singapore from our regression analysis.
Table 1. B&R countries.
East and South Asia
Afghanistan Bangladesh Brunei Darussalam Cambodia
India Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia
Mongolia Myanmar Nepal Pakistan
Philippines Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand
Timor-Leste Vietnam
Europe and Central Asia
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus
Czech Republic Estonia Georgia Greece
Hungary Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Lithuania Macedonia, FYR Moldova Montenegro
Poland Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Slovak Republic Slovenia Tajikistan Turkey
Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan
Middle East and North Africa
Bahrain Egypt, Arab Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep. Iraq
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic
United Arab Emirates West Bank and Gaza Yemen, Rep.
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The geographical distribution of China’s ODI into B&R countries is quite unbalanced. The right
panel of Table 2 lists the top 15 countries absorbing China’s ODI in terms of total stock in 2015 and
shows that the average GDP per capita ($10,760) of these 15 countries is slightly higher than the world
average ($10,191). However, if we consider the countries’ economic size and rank according to China’s
ODI stock as a percentage of the host country’s GDP (a measurement of direct investment intensity),
then the list of the top 15 countries changes dramatically. This group is mainly comprised of less
developed countries (except Singapore and Kazakhstan) with average GDP per capita of $5700 in
2015 (please see the left panel of Table 2). Note that eight countries—Lao PDR, Mongolia, Cambodia,
Singapore, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and Pakistan—appear in both the left and right panels in
Table 2, suggesting that these eight countries are important destinations of China’s ODI, regardless of
whether we use absolute or relative measurements.












Lao PDR 39.14% 1818 Singapore 31,985 52,889
Mongolia 32.02% 3968 Russian Federation 14,020 9238
Cambodia 20.36% 1159 Indonesia 8125 3346
Kyrgyz Republic 16.29% 1103 Kazakhstan 5095 10,510
Tajikistan 11.58% 926 Lao PDR 4842 1818
Singapore 10.93% 52,889 United Arab Emirates 4603 40,439
Timor-Leste 6.96% 1158 Myanmar 4259 1161
Myanmar 6.80% 1161 Pakistan 4036 1435
Georgia 3.82% 3796 India 3770 1598
Kazakhstan 2.76% 10,510 Mongolia 3760 3968
Afghanistan 2.17% 594 Cambodia 3676 1159
Vietnam 1.74% 2111 Thailand 3440 5815
Pakistan 1.49% 1435 Vietnam 3374 2111
Nepal 1.38% 743 Iran 2949 5436
Uzbekistan 1.32% 2132 Saudi Arabia 2434 20,482
Average 10.58% 5700 Average 6691 10,760
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI and SBCOFDI.
We now explain our key variables and data sources used for constructing them as follows.
3.1. Dependent Variable
The indicators of institutional quality (INSQ) are the explained variables. North [64] defines
institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions”.
Some scholars have developed indicators to quantify the institutional quality of a country or region,
such as the aforementioned Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) introduced by Kaufmann and
Kraay (For a detailed introduction to the WGI, the interested reader can refer to Kaufmann et al. [65]
and to the WGI website: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc). These indicators
are as follows:
(1) Control of corruption (CC) captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption; it also gives an indication
on the degree to which the state is “captured” by elites’ and private interests.
(2) Government effectiveness (GE) captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies.
(3) Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS) measures perceptions of the likelihood of
political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.
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(4) Regulatory quality (RQ) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
(5) Rule of law (RL) captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society; it refers in particular to the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
(6) Voice and accountability (VA) captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association and a free media.
The WGI website contains data on 215 countries from the year 1996. WGI permits meaningful
cross-country and over-time comparisons, even after taking the measurement error into account [65]
and is widely used in empirical studies in international business, institutional economics, and political
science [66–69]. Therefore, we use the WGI to measure the institutional quality of the host countries.
Further, we also argue that institutional quality is a construct which is difficult to be captured
in a single indicator. We therefore use a fine-grained approach for its measurement. We follow the
WGI design and test the above hypotheses in two steps. First, we test the effect of China’s ODI on the
average of the six WGI indicators to capture a general picture. Second, we test the effects on each of
those six WGI indicators respectively. This contrasts with the existing literature which either focuses
on one aspect of institutional quality, such as corruption [15,18,19], or on some aggregated index of
institutional quality [13,22].
For the aggregated index of the institutional quality we use the simple average of the six indicators
as an additional dependent variable (WGI average). We however exclude the data from Singapore
because of its extraordinary high values of institutional quality (however, the direction and significance
of estimated coefficients did not change much whether or not we incorporate the data of Singapore
into the regression).
3.2. Independent Variable
(1) China’ ODI intensity (CDII) serves as the key explanatory variable. In consideration of the
cumulative effect of ODI and the economic size of the host countries, we measure CDII using China’s
ODI stock as a percentage of the host country’s GDP. This measurement is in line with Prakash and
Potoski [56], Malesky [16], and Gossel [70]. Data regarding China’s direct investment comes from
the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (corresponding years), and it is
compiled by the Ministry of Commerce in China. The GDP data are obtained from the WDI database.
3.3. Control Variables
There are extensive empirical studies on the determinants of institutional quality. In this study,
we choose to include a set of control variables, which are frequently contained in models that explain
the differences of institutional quality across countries.
(1) GDP per capita (GDPPC): This variable is measured in thousands of dollars at the constant price
of 2010, which represents the synthetic economic development level of a country. It is expected
that a rising economic development level leads to better institutional quality. Hence, following
Zeng and Eastin [52] and Demir [13], we include this indicator in our model.
(2) Intensity of FDI from countries other than China (FDII): In line with the construction of CDII,
FDII is measured as the difference between total FDI stock and China’s ODI stock in the host
country, as a percentage of the host country’s GDP. The data regarding total FDI stock are obtained
from the UNCTAD database. Since FDI coming from other countries may have a competitive
relationship with Chinese ODI and may exert an influence on the institutional quality of host
countries, we incorporate this variable into the model.
(3) Trade openness (Open): This variable is measured as the sum of export and import as a percentage
of a country’s GDP. Rodrik [71] argues that open countries are more subject to external shocks,
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and therefore need a better institution for stabilizing their economy; therefore, trade openness is
also associated with a country’s institutional quality. On the other hand, trade openness is directly
linked to FDI inflows. Hence, in line with Kalliny et al. [69], we include this variable in the model.
(4) Internet penetration (Internet): This variable is measured as the percentage of people with access
to Internet in a country and is directly obtained from the WDI database. It is widely acknowledged
that Internet penetration is associated with information transmission and media freedom in a
country, which significantly influences institutional quality [72]. Asongu and Nwachukwu [68]
treat Internet penetration as a tool of knowledge diffusion and find it has a positive effect on
political governance. Based on these arguments, we include this variable in the model.
(5) Natural resource contribution (NRC): This variable is measured as the total natural resource rents
as a percentage of a country’s GDP, which is directly obtained from the WDI database. The total
natural resource rents are the difference between the value of natural resources (oil, natural gas,
coal, mineral, and forest) production at world prices and total costs of production, reflecting
the abundance of natural resources in a country. Natural resources influence economic and
institutional development in a complex way. On the one hand, exporting natural resource-related
products brings desired foreign exchange for developing countries, which is beneficial to economic
growth. On the other hand, exporting these resources can cause a country to rely too heavily on
its natural resources, hindering its long-term economic growth, as the resource curse hypothesis
posits. Furthermore, some scholars hold the viewpoint that natural resource seeking is one of
the motivations of China’s ODI [27,28,30–33]. Therefore, excluding this variable would bias
the estimation.
The summary statistics of the above variables are listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary statistics.
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CC Control of Corruption 732 −0.3179 0.7117 −1.6984 1.7229
GE Government Effectiveness 732 −0.0975 0.7583 −1.7701 1.5651
PS Political Stability 732 −0.3740 0.9676 −3.1848 1.3995
RQ Regulatory Quality 732 −0.0569 0.8466 −2.3447 1.6749
RL Rule of Law 732 −0.2206 0.7725 −1.9516 1.3646
VA Voice & Accountability 732 −0.3982 0.8768 −2.2176 1.1719
WGI avg Aggregate Institutional Quality 732 −0.2442 0.7205 −1.9283 1.2140
CDII China’s ODI Intensity 732 0.0100 0.0347 4.04E-07 0.3202
GDPPC GDP per capita 732 10.5396 13.3483 0.3737 74.6866
FDII FDI intensity from other countries 732 0.4115 0.7516 0.0064 8.3160
Open Trade Openness 732 0.9358 0.3767 0.0017 2.1037
Internet Internet Penetration 732 0.3221 0.2502 2.41E-04 0.9288
NRC Natural Resource Contribution 732 0.1268 0.2907 5.79E-06 3.4417
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI, WGI, SBCOFDI and the UNCTAD database.
3.4. Model Specification and Estimation Methods
The benchmark model to capture the institutional effect of China’s ODI on B&R countries is
specified as follows:
INSQit = βCDIIit + γ′Mit + α+ λi + εit (1)
where the subscripts i and t stand for host country (i = 1, 2, . . . , 63) and year (t = 2003, 2004 . . . , 2016),
respectively. INSQ denotes the institutional quality of the host country, which is measured according
to the six WGI dimensions discussed in Section 3.1. CDII represents the intensity of China’s ODI into
the host country, which is measured as China’s ODI stock in a host country as a percentage of this
country’s GDP. M represents a set of control variables, which capture some important characteristics
of the host country. α is a constant and λ denotes host-country fixed effects, capturing culture and
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geographic heterogeneity across B&R countries. β and γ are the coefficients to be estimated, and ε is
the error term. Under the assumption of no omitted variable and measurement errors, the fixed effects
estimator gives a consistent estimator of β. According to H1, we expect β to be significantly positive.
We report the standard fixed effects estimation in Section 4.1.
Note that model (1) suffers from potential endogeneity biases. First, institution persists, that is
today’s institution will affect the one tomorrow [46]. Hence a lagged term referring to the institutional
quality variable should be incorporated into the model. Since this variable is omitted in model (1),
the fixed effects estimator cannot eliminate this bias [73]. Second, China’s ODI and the institutional
quality of the host countries influence each other simultaneously; this is also referred to as the reverse
causality problem, which also biases the fixed effects estimator.
Following Acemoglu et al. [74], we incorporate the first lag of the dependent variable into the
model and replicate all the benchmark estimations using two-step difference GMM regressions in order
to address endogeneity concerns. Proposed by Arellano and Bond [75], the difference GMM method,
also referred to as the Arellano–Bond estimator, is used to perform an IV estimation using the lagged
terms of endogenous variables as instruments for the endogenous variables themselves. With the
assumption of no autocorrelation among error terms, the difference GMM produces a consistent
estimator. According to model (1), the dynamic models are specified as follows:
INSQit = ρINSQit−1 + βCDIIit + γ′Mit + α+ λi + εit (2)
To explore the heterogeneous effect of China’s ODI on B&R countries with different natural
resource endowments (i.e., to test H2), we add an interaction term between CDII and a natural resource
variable (NRC, discussed in Section 3.3) into the model, and we obtain thus:
INSQit = ρINSQit−1 + βCDIIit + δCDIIit ×NRCit + γ′Mit + α+ λi + εit (3)
Coefficient ρ captures the level of institutional persistence between two consecutive years.
Coefficient β can be interpreted as the short-term impact of CDII on an institution, and the long-term
impact can be calculated as β/(1 − ρ), according to Acemoglu et al. [74]. In models (2) and (3), we treat
the lagged dependent variable, CDII, and the interaction term as endogenous, and other variables as
exogenous in order to reduce the number of instruments used and avoid weak instrument problems.
We report the difference GMM estimation in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4. Results
4.1. Benchmark Model Results
We first estimate model (1) with the fixed effects estimator (we test the hypothesis that the
intercepts (λi) are all equal with F tests shown in the second last row of Table 4, which implies that fixed
effects model is more appropriate than the OLS model. Hausman tests further support fixed effects
model rather than random effects model. Because of space limitations, we only present estimation of
fixed effects model). The results are reported in Table 4. Columns (1) to (7) use different dimensions of
institutional quality as dependent variables, with the first dependent variable (WGI average) being
the simple average of the six WGI indicators. Column (1) shows that China’s ODI intensity (CDII)
is significantly and positively associated with WGI average. More specifically, columns (2) to (7)
show that CDII has significant and positive relationships with the first five institution variables.
This suggests that a host country with a higher share of China’s ODI tends to have higher levels of
control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law.
It means that for most of the countries of the B&R initiative, China’s ODI tends to have a positive
impact on the host country’s institutional framework, except for voice and accountability. These results
provide support to H1 to a large extent, which states that China’s ODI improves institutional quality of
B&R countries.
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Table 4. Fixed effects estimation results.
Dependent
Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WGI Avg CC GE PS RQ RL VA
CDII
1.1841 *** 1.0898 ** 0.5114 * 2.0183 *** 1.3918 ** 1.0272 *** 1.066
[0.3553] [0.5154] [0.2904] [0.6154] [0.6975] [0.3902] [0.8201]
GDPPC
0.0127 0.0135 0.0062 0.0179 0.0204 ** 0.0157 * 0.0022
[0.0078] [0.0107] [0.0102] [0.0109] [0.0082] [0.0087] [0.0038]
FDII
0.0098 0.0187 * 0.0128 0.009 −0.0045 0.0161 ** 0.0066
[0.0065] [0.0095] [0.0109] [0.0144] [0.0096] [0.0078] [0.0061]
Open 0.0848 0.1177 0.0564 0.1104 0.067 0.0226 0.1348
[0.0728] [0.0992] [0.0902] [0.1435] [0.0965] [0.0830] [0.0840]
Internet
0.0111 −0.0596 0.3021 *** −0.2175 0.1108 0.1520* −0.2211 ***
[0.0790] [0.1132] [0.0953] [0.1823] [0.0873] [0.0890] [0.0768]
NRC
−0.0818 −0.0596 0.0258 −0.2744 ** −0.1835 *** 0.037 −0.0358
[0.0590] [0.0941] [0.0883] [0.1319] [0.0472] [0.0743] [0.0581]
Constant
−0.4660 *** −0.5624 *** −0.3269 *** −0.5849 *** −0.3590 *** −0.4780 *** −0.4850 ***
[0.1006] [0.1450] [0.1182] [0.1679] [0.1230] [0.1080] [0.1025]
Obs. 732 732 732 732 732 732 732
within R2 0.0846 0.0433 0.1181 0.041 0.1253 0.1099 0.0686
F 3.0668 1.6931 4.1746 3.3557 5.9189 3.7856 2.3295
p value 0.0110 0.1383 0.0014 0.0064 0.0001 0.0029 0.0435
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; (2) the numbers in brackets [ ]
show the robust standard errors with Windmeijer finite sample correction.
However, there is no significant effect of CDII on voice and accountability, although the coefficient
remains positive. It is not surprising since China has less experience in this domain given its one-Party
rule regime. Consequently, Chinese ODI’s positive influence on these countries in general can in turn
be explained by the institutional distance existing between China and most of the B&R countries.
Since China unleashed its “Going Global” policy, it has been able to put in place adequate institutions
so as to facilitate its ODI. These institutions are of superior quality when compared with those of
B&R countries such as Mongolia, Tajikistan, or Iran. Obviously, this does not apply to a few selected
countries encompassed in the B&R group such as Poland and Hungary, which are also part of the
European Union.
Moreover, GDPPC is positively related with the six WGI indicators, but it is only significantly
related with regulatory quality and rule of law. For the intensity of FDI from other countries, FDII is
positively related with five institutional variables, but only significant for rule of law and control of
corruption, and it is negatively associated with the host countries’ regulatory quality. The coefficients
of trade openness in all seven columns are positive and not significant for the six institutional variables.
Internet penetration has a significantly positive relationship with government effectiveness and rule
of law, but a significantly negative relationship with voice and accountability. Finally, host countries
with higher levels of natural resources contribution tend to have significantly lower levels of political
stability and regulatory quality, which is partly in line with the resource curse hypothesis. The variable
NRC is also negatively related with control of corruption, voice and accountability, and WGI average,
though not significantly.
4.2. Difference GMM Estimation Results
In coping with the endogeneity problem, we use the difference GMM method to estimate model (3)
following a two-step procedure. The results are in Table 5. The Sargen test confirms that the instruments
used are valid in all specifications. Except for column (7) in Table 5, the p-values for the AR1 show that
we can reject the null hypothesis that no first-order autocorrelation exists among the first-differenced
error terms, and the p-values for the AR2 indicate that there is no second-order autocorrelation
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among the first-differenced error terms, which satisfies the condition for applying the difference
GMM estimation.
Table 5. Difference generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation results.
Dependent
Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WGI Avg CC GE PS RQ RL VA
WGI avg (t-1) 0.4961 ***
[0.1452]
CC (t-1) 0.4744 ***
[0.1043]
GE (t-1) 0.2363 *
[0.1233]
PS (t-1) 0.6070 ***
[0.1069]
RQ (t-1) 0.5330 ***
[0.1524]
RL (t-1) 0.6209 ***
[0.1502]
VA (t-1) 0.3655 **
[0.1581]
CDII
0.8519 ** 1.3684 *** 0.5885 ** 0.7663 * 0.9974 ** 0.7884 * 0.5727
[0.3805] [0.4446] [0.2963] [0.4222] [0.4982] [0.4205] [0.4699]
GDPPC
0.002 −0.0088 0.003 0.0037 0.0099 0.0015 0.0039
[0.0044] [0.0085] [0.0047] [0.0097] [0.0072] [0.0075] [0.0035]
FDII
−0.0086 0.0096 −0.0072 −0.0329 −0.0198 0.0008 −0.0183
[0.0223] [0.0258] [0.0240] [0.0444] [0.0245] [0.0178] [0.0177]
Open −0.0355 −0.0503 −0.0994 −0.0411 0.0172 −0.0162 −0.0509
[0.0366] [0.0452] [0.0647] [0.0923] [0.0470] [0.0516] [0.0448]
Internet
0.0292 0.0445 0.2343 ** 0.1026 −0.0232 −0.0097 −0.0194
[0.0485] [0.0714] [0.1041] [0.1511] [0.0675] [0.0692] [0.0783]
NRC
−0.0278 0.0055 −0.0278 −0.1134 ** −0.0994 ** −0.0768 ** 0.0208
[0.0320] [0.0539] [0.0574] [0.0573] [0.0485] [0.0345] [0.0636]
Constant
−0.0857 −0.0449 −0.0748 −0.1497 −0.0967 −0.052 −0.2040 *
[0.0790] [0.1160] [0.1178] [0.1554] [0.0907] [0.1136] [0.1062]
Obs. 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
χ2 28.0532 50.263 50.5336 55.2209 41.1262 48.9975 10.1951
AR1 −2.6899 −3.6531 −2.4337 −3.4652 −2.7728 −3.1777 −1.2891
p value 0.0071 0.0003 0.0149 0.0005 0.0056 0.0015 0.1973
AR2 0.2601 0.1147 −0.0616 0.1237 0.1181 −0.8373 −2.2008
p value 0.7948 0.9087 0.9509 0.9015 0.9060 0.4024 0.0277
Sargen 48.3048 52.30513 55.48602 58.11463 33.97952 50.23491 56.34817
p value 0.5814 0.4231 0.6058 0.2298 0.3724 0.504 0.2818
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; (2) the numbers in brackets [ ]
show the robust standard errors with the Windmeijer finite sample correction.
CDII still exerts significantly positive effects on the WGI average (column 1) and the first five
WGI indicators: control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality,
and rule of law (column 2 to 6). These results lend support to H1. If the difference GMM estimation
can be interpreted as causal, this suggests that, all other things being equal, each 0.01 increase in CDII
will improve the value of control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory
quality and rule of law by 0.0137, 0.0059, 0.0077, 0.00997, and 0.0079, respectively, for host countries in
the short term.
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The first order lagged institutional variables are significant in all seven columns with coefficients
ranging between 0 and 1. This implies the persistence of institutions over time and a trend toward
convergence. It further implies that China’s ODI intensity improves the equilibrium levels of host
countries’ institutional quality in the long run. According to Acemoglu et al. [73], the long-term
effect of CDII can be calculated as ∆CDII × β/(1−ρ). Specifically, all other things being equal, each
0.01 increase of CDII will improve the levels of control of corruption, government effectiveness, political
stability, regulatory quality and rule of law by 0.0260, 0.0077, 0.0195, 0.0214, 0.0208, respectively, for
host countries in the long term. Thus, both the short-term and long-term quantitative effects of China’s
ODI intensity are modest, but by no means negligible.
For column (7), a further Arellano-Bond test shows that there is no third-order autocorrelation
among the differenced error terms. Hence, we use higher order lagged terms of endogenous variables
as instruments to re-estimate the model in column (7). Meanwhile, we also estimate the fixed effects
model with lagged dependent variables VA (t−1). The estimation results show a similar pattern to
column (7) in Table 4, with the key explanatory variable CDII remaining insignificant.
For the control variables, GDPPC is not significant for all six variables, implying that economic
development may be the result of institutional improvement, rather than the cause of it [46].
Direct investment from other countries is also insignificant, and negatively associated with four
of the six institution variables and the WGI average. Trade openness exerts no significant impact on
institutional quality. Internet penetration still exerts a positive impact on government effectiveness but
is loosely related with other dimensions of institutional quality. Natural resource contribution exerts
significant and negative effects on political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law, which is in line
again with the resource curse hypothesis.
4.3. Difference GMM Estimation Results with an Interaction Term
To explore the heterogeneous effects of China’s ODI intensity on institutional quality of countries
with different natural resources abundance, we add an interaction term between CDII and NRC
(CDII × NRC). We estimate model (3) using the difference GMM method, and the results are in Table 6.
The Sargen test shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all the instruments are valid.
The Arellano-Bond tests demonstrate that there is a high first-order, but no second-order, autocorrelation
among the first-differenced residuals, except for column (7). We further test column (7) by the method
proposed in sub-Section 4.2 and find that CDII and the interaction term remain insignificant.
Columns (1) to (4) show that CDII still exerts a positive impact on the WGI average, as well as on
control of corruption, government effectiveness, and political stability, with insignificant coefficients of
the interaction terms. These results provide support both to H1 and H2. Furthermore, the interaction
terms are positively significant in columns (5) and (6), which indicates that China’s ODI in host
countries with more abundant natural resources generates stronger institutional effects on enhancing
regulatory quality and rule of law. In other words, absorbing China’s ODI is beneficial to these
countries in that they may minimize the “resource curse”.
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Table 6. Difference GMM estimation results with interaction term.
Dependent
Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WGI Avg CC GE PS RQ RL VA
WGI avg (t-1) 0.5548 ***
[0.1570]
CC (t-1) 0.4757 ***
[0.1147]
GE (t-1) 0.2302 *
[0.1253]
PS (t-1) 0.6298 ***
[0.1132]
RQ (t-1) 0.5493 ***
[0.1314]
RL (t-1) 0.6236 ***
[0.2404]
VA (t-1) 0.3858 *
[0.2006]
CDII
0.8266 ** 1.4850 *** 0.7850 * 1.1046 * 0.3456 0.4661 0.9762
[0.3736] [0.5343] [0.4607] [0.6298] [0.3546] [1.1291] [1.0032]
CDII × NRC
0.9586 −1.6795 −0.584 2.3621 5.3166 ** 3.6817 *** −4.9225
[1.0303] [1.4558] [1.5846] [1.6818] [2.0773] [1.4150] [6.1681]
GDPPC
0.0019 −0.0119 0.0019 0.0034 0.0085 0.0016 0.003
[0.0042] [0.0090] [0.0034] [0.0110] [0.0057] [0.0099] [0.0054]
FDII
−0.014 0.0218 −0.0148 −0.0261 −0.0193 −0.0062 −0.0148
[0.0276] [0.0207] [0.0340] [0.0365] [0.0224] [0.0246] [0.0146]
Open −0.0313 −0.0575 −0.0834 * −0.0238 0.0215 −0.0155 −0.0345
[0.0362] [0.0474] [0.0461] [0.0999] [0.0499] [0.0581] [0.0498]
Internet
0.0428 0.0288 0.2455 *** 0.0841 −0.0188 −0.0003 −0.0269
[0.0596] [0.0680] [0.0859] [0.1503] [0.0686] [0.0825] [0.0771]
NRC
−0.0299 −0.0109 −0.0372 −0.0984 * −0.1106 ** −0.0724 0.015
[0.0311] [0.0517] [0.0592] [0.0594] [0.0510] [0.1369] [0.0669]
Constant
−0.0691 0.0048 −0.0628 −0.1449 −0.1062 −0.0704 −0.1978 *
[0.0692] [0.1107] [0.1010] [0.1700] [0.0905] [0.1369] [0.1194]
Obs. 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
χ2 61.196 60.392 31.4563 54.3145 45.6953 43.4406 6.4021
AR1 −2.8158 −3.4404 −2.4066 −3.4625 −3.1863 −2.2557 −1.1398
p value 0.0049 0.0006 0.0161 0.0005 0.0014 0.0241 0.2544
AR2 0.3205 0.1343 −0.069 0.1214 0.1484 −0.7219 −2.1592
p value 0.7486 0.8932 0.945 0.9034 0.882 0.4703 0.0308
Sargen 45.55214 41.34392 46.51854 53.35155 47.38686 56.4356 56.5385
p value 0.3265 0.4996 0.2917 0.1125 0.2622 0.6755 0.6719
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; (2) the numbers in brackets [ ]
show the robust standard errors with the Windmeijer finite sample correction.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
With the increasingly improved international competitiveness of its MNCs and the rapid
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, China has gradually transformed from a country focusing
mainly on absorbing foreign capital to a country attaching equal importance to absorbing foreign
capital and exporting domestic capital. In 2015 and 2016, China’s outward direct investment (ODI)
flows reached $145.7 and $196.2 billion respectively, ranking second in the world.
The B&R initiative is observed to promote and facilitate the new wave globalization [76].
Since China proposed the B&R Initiative in 2013, its ODI into B&R countries has risen steadily,
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from $13.7 billion in 2014 to $15.3 billion in 2016 [62]. As a result, B&R countries became important
destinations of China’s ODI, as they provided market for effectively resolving China’s excess production
capacity. As argued by Pauls and Gottwald [35], the B&R initiative is to foster a win-win cooperation
with the partner countries. It is therefore clear that not only is China’s ODI a key pillar in the B&R
Initiative, but also that China’s ODI lays the foundation that allows B&R countries to not only enter
the global industrial value chain and promote regional economic cooperation, but also to facilitate
sustainable development in these countries [42,43]. Given the vast geographical coverage and size of the
economy, the B&R group of countries is an important new context in the world economy [36]. The B&R
initiative, which seeks to improve the linkage between China and its neighboring countries [77], is one
of the most important strategies for China’s opening up in the current era of globalization. It is also a
means to contribute to the sustainable development of countries involved [44]. Motivated by the key
observation that the quality of a country’s institutions plays an important role to realize the Sustainable
Development Goals of the United Nations [12], we examine whether the B&R initiative improves the
institutional quality of host countries involved. Situated in the broad field of economic integration
theory, we use insights from international business and institutional economics to investigate the
impact of China’s ODI on the institutional quality of the 63 B&R countries during the period 2003 to
2016. Our findings are summarized as follows.
First, although a high percentage of Chinese B&R projects are in regions with high political
risks [78], this ODI from China improves the institutional quality of B&R countries, including control
of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and WGI
average. No significant effect is found for voice and accountability, which is in line with what one
would logically expect. These results suggest that China through its “going global” strategy has been
able to improve drastically the key institutions of the B&R countries, with the exception of those
countries with pre-existing high levels of institutional development (e.g., countries belonging to the
European Union). In other words, for most B&R countries, China might be seen as a role model in view
of its successful capability at investing abroad, which may have been resulted from the improvement
of its own institutional framework. Second, according to the dynamic model, China’s ODI not only
promotes the institutional quality of host countries in the short run, but also improves the equilibrium
level of the institutional quality in the long run. Third, China’s ODI exerts no differential impacts on the
dimensions of control of corruption, government effectiveness, and political stability of countries with
different natural resource endowments. However, China’s ODI in host countries with richer natural
resources generates stronger institutional effects in improving regulatory quality and rule of law,
indicating that China’s ODI may help the such host B&R countries minimize their “resource curse”.
These findings enrich our knowledge of the institutional effects of China’s ODI and may shed
light on the policy design for the B&R initiative in the near future. The results obtained suggest a
number of implications, which are economic, managerial, and political, all of which contribute to
the sustainable development of the countries involved. From an economic/managerial viewpoint,
and in line with standard theory of economic integration, there are substantial gains arising from
more economic integration between countries. From a policy/political viewpoint, it is clear that
strengthening the supervision and auditing of Chinese MNCs should be a priority for the Chinese
government. Such actions would help to enhance the “regulatory pressure effect” and streamline
MNCs’ behavior. For B&R countries, this initiative is undoubtedly a great opportunity to “catch up”
economically with the rest of the world in many respects. By absorbing China’s direct investment,
these countries can improve their institutional quality, minimize the resource curse, and achieve
sustainable development. Moreover, the Chinese government should actively advance cultural
exchanges and business cooperation between Chinese MNCs and the enterprises and/or governments
of host countries, which would lay the foundation of the “demonstration effect” for the MNCs.
In addition, the Chinese government should continue its fight against corruption both at home and
abroad in order to establish a healthy image of Chinese MNCs. From a theoretical viewpoint, the article
contributes the extant scholarship on the effects of developing country ODI on host country institutional
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quality. Extant scholarship examining the effect of FDI on institutional quality of host countries is
limited. The present case of the B&R initiative can further be theoretically supported and expanded by
the gravity model and/or core-periphery models as sub-sets of economic integration theory. Finally,
the study has also contributed empirically through a fine-grained analysis of country level institutional
quality. Extant literature focuses either on one aspect of institutional quality or some aggregated
index. The present study tests the effects on all the six identified WGI indicators of institutional
quality separately.
The study has the following limitations that can drive future research. First, our study has a
limitation of the time frame involved in the analysis. The B&R initiative began from the year 2013.
The time period in our analysis is thus limited. Future inquiry, to further validate our findings, should
therefore extend this line of research using a longer time frame to examine the effects of B&R ODI on
the institutional quality of the host countries. Second, as mentioned earlier, the causal relationship
between FDI and institutions operates both ways. Extant research suggests that good institutional
quality of host countries encourages FDI inflows [1–4,10]. While we have addressed this issue in our
study conceptually by using insights from extant research [15] and empirically using the difference
GMM-model [75], we feel that future research can deliberate further both conceptually and empirically
to address better the concerns of reverse causality in examining the effects of FDI on the quality of
host country institutions. Third, the findings in regard to “resource course” may be applicable to
countries which are rich in natural resources but have questionable institutional quality (e.g., Iran,
Iraq, etc.,). Whether the findings will be applicable to countries which are rich in resources and with
strong institutional quality will need to be examined by future research (e.g., Canada, United States,
etc.,). Again, because of the short time period the impact of B&R initiative on sustainable development,
examined empirically, has not been significant [44]. Future, research can further factor our findings
to validate the role of B&R FDI in sustainable development. The role of institutional quality as a
mechanism to understand the effect of B&R FDI on sustainable development of the countries involved
may be empirically tested. In other words, the mediating role of the quality of host country institutions,
in the influence of B&R FDI on sustainable development can be empirically tested.
Our findings can also motivate future research in regard to the nature of institutions in the
host country. The present study examines the effect of the B&R initiative on host country formal
institutions only. Extant research has suggested that informal institutions may also influence sustainable
development of societies. Informal institutions such as sustainability values [79] and culturally endorsed
leadership theories [80] have been found to influence sustainable development activities in societies.
In terms of future research, longitudinal studies can therefore examine the impact of the B&R initiative
on the informal institutions of the host country. Future research can also examine whether the nature
of FDI in B&R countries has an influence on institutional quality of the host country. For example,
investments by Chinese firms can differ from being a joint venture, a merger or acquisition, or a
greenfield activity. Will the nature of investment influence the institutional quality in the host country?
The role of the type of the Chinese firms active in B&R countries can be examined. Since non-state-owned
firms are engaged more in non-infrastructure related activities, they are likely to be more active in
ODI in non-infrastructure industries in B&R countries [36]. So, does the type of the investing firm
influence the institutional quality of the host country? Finally, we have evaluated Chinese FDI driven
by the B&R initiative in this study. Hence only the countries that are covered by this initiative are
considered in this study. Would our findings be applicable for non B&R FDI from China? We hope our
findings would motivate future inquiry on these and other questions on the role of FDI in improving
the institutional quality of countries involved and finally contribute to understanding the mechanisms
that drive sustainable development.
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